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ABSTRACT
Trinko, a local telecommunicationservicescustomerof
AT&T, sued Verizon for anti-competitivelyraisingthe costsof
AT&T, Verizon'srivalin themarketfor localtelecommunications
services.Pursuantto therulesof theTelecommunicationsAct of
1996,AT&T wasleasingpartsof thelocaltelecommunicationset-
work(unbundlednetworkelements,"UNEs")fromVerizonat"cost
plus reasonableprofit" prices. The SupremeCourt held that
Trinko'scomplaintfailedtostatea claimunder§ 2of theSherman
Act,anddismissedthecomplaint.I arguethattheCourt drewin-
.correctinferencesfrom its AsPenSkiingdecision.The Court also
misseda keyverticalleveragingissuein Trinko.The openingof
competitionmandatedby the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996
challengedVerizon'straditionalmonopolyin thelocaltelecommu-
nicationsservicesmarket.By raisingthe costand/or decreasing
thequalityof theserviceof rivalsin theretailingservicesmarket,
Verizonaimedto preservethatmonopoly.As a resultof theseef-
forts,rivalssuffereda disadvantage.YetVerizonalsocausedretail-
ing rivalsto leasea lowernumberof unbundlednetworkelements
andthusincurredarevenuesacrifice.ThereforetheactionsofVer-
izonin raisingthecostsof retailingtelecommunicationsservicesri-
vals are an indication of. liability accordingto the. "sacrifice
principle"proposedin theGovernment'sbriefin Trinko,according
to whicha defendantis liableif its conduct"involvesa sacrificeof
short-termprofitsor goodwillthatmakessenseonly insofaras it
helpsthe defendantmaintainor obtainmonopolypower,"even
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though the sacrificeprinciple defines a stringent condition for a
finding of liability.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The VerizonCommunicationsI c. v. Law Officesoj Curti~V.
Trinkoldecisionis a majorinterpretationbytheSupremeCourtof
theconditionsuJ}derwhicha ShermanAct section2 monopoliza-
tionviolationcanbesustained.2Trinko,a purchaserof localtele-
communicationservicesfromAT&T, suedVerizonfor raisingthe
costsof andotherwisedisadvantagingAT&T throughanti-competi-
tiveac:tions.3AT&T, whichwasVerizon'srivalin the retail local
telecommunicationsservicesmarket,wasleasingpartsof the local
telecommunicationsetworkinfrastructure,orunbundlednetwork
elements(hereinafter"UNEs"), from Verizon accordingto the
rulesof theTelecommunicationsActof 1996.Theserulesimposed
on theleasesa '1ustandreasonablerate. . . basedonthecost".that
"mayincludea reasonableprofit"anda requirementhattherate
1.540U.S.398(2004).
2. Seegenerallyid.
3. Id. at 402-05.
,.
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be "nondiscriminatory."4The Supreme Court held that Trinko's
complaintfailed to statea claim under § 2 of the ShermanAct.5 In
doing so, the Court drew incorrect inferences from its decision in
AspenSkiingCo.v. AspenHighlandsSkiingCorp.6
The Court alsomisseda keyverticalleveragingissuein Trinko.
Verizon leveragedits monopoly of local telecommunicationsnet-
work infrastructureby raising the costsor decreasingthe qualityof
servicesof rival local telecommunicationsservicesproviders (such
asAT&T) who leasedUNEs from Verizon, placing such rivals at a
disadvantage.In this manner, Verizon usedactions that raised the
costsof rivalsto preserveits monopoly in the local telecommunica-
tions servicesmarket. But Verizon also causeda lower number of
leasesof UNEs to be leasedto retailing rivals,and thus incurred a
revenuesacrifice. Therefore, the actionsof Verizon create liability
under the "sacrificeprinciple" proposed in the Government'sbrief
in Trinko,wherebya defendant is liable if its conduct "involvesa
sacrifice of short-termprofits or goodwill that makessense.only in-
sofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly
power."7
The restof this article is organizedasfollows. Part II discusses
the recent evolution of telecommunicationsin the United States,
including the breakup of AT&T in 1981and the major regulatory
reform introduced in the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996and its
implementation. This part also defines and explains the "vertical
price squeeze"and "raising rivals' costs"strategiesand showshow
thesestrategiesmayhavebeen implementedin the 1981-96 period
in the absenceof the judicially imposed businessline restrictions
createdwith the breakup of AT&T in 1981.8 This part also de-
scribes the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996and its implementa-
tion. Part III summarizesthe Supreme Court's Trinko decision.
Part IV discussesissuesand problems arising from the Trinko deci-
sion. Part V discussesthe vertical leveragingissuesin Trinko, in-
cluding foreclosure through a vertical price squeeze as well as
through raisingrivals'costs. PartVI discussesthe application of the
4. TelecommunicationsAct, 47U.S.C.§ 252(d)(1)(1996).
5. Trinka,540U.S.at416.
6. 472U.S.585(1985).
7. Briefof AmiciCuriaeUnitedStatesandtheFederalTradeCommissionat
16,VerizonCommunications1nc.v.LawOfficesof CurtisV. Trinko, 540U.S.398
(2004)(No.02-682). .
8. The decisionthatfinalizedthe antitrustsuitof the United Statesagainst
AT&T andformalizedthe1981AT&T breakupwasUnitedStatesv.AmericanTel.
andTel. Co.,552F. Supp.131(D.C.Cir. 1982)[hereinafter"ModificationofFinal
, Judgment"or "MFJ"].
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"sacrifice principle" in antitrust law.
remarks.
Part VII has concluding
II.
BACKGROUND ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS
A. The1981BreakupofAT&T
To understandthecontextof the Trinkocase,weneedto ex-
aminethemarketsfor telecommunicationsservicesin theUnited
Statesgoingbackto thebreakupof AT&T in 1981.The U.S. De-
partmentof Justice (USDOJ or Departmentof Justice) filed a
landmarkantitrustsuitagainstAT&T, UnitedStatesv.AmericanTele-
phoneandTelegraphCO.,9in 1974.10Mter a longantitrustbattle,in
1981AT&T agreedtobreakup intoeightcompanieswithverylim-
itedcompetitionamongthem.l1Emergingfromthe1981breakup,
AT&T's long distanceservicecompanyretainedtheAT&T name
while Ameritech,Bell Atlantic,BellSouth,NYNEX, Pacific Bell,
SouthwesternBell ("SBC"),andUSWest(collectively,theRegional
Bell OperatingCompanies,hereinafter"RBOCs") were created
withlegallyprotectedmonopoliesin theirrespectivelocaltelecom-
munications ervicesmarkets.J2A numberof facilities-basedcom-
petitorsthat ownedtheir own networks- such as MCI, Sprint,
Qwest,Level3, andWilliams- enteredthe long distancemarket
alongwithhundredsof longdistanceresellers.Advancesin thela-
ser electronicsusedin fiber-optictransmissionalso allowedin-
stalled networks to enhance their transmissiontechnology.
Significantincreasesin thenumberof competitorsandin thelong
9. 642F.2d 1285(D.C.Cir. 1980).
10. The government'sallegations,amongothers,werethat (i) AT&T's rela-
tionshipwithWesternElectricwasillegal,and (ii) AT&T monopolizedthe long
distancemarket.The DO] soughtdivestitureof bothmanufacturingandlongdis-
tancefrom localservice.For a summarydiscussionof UnitedStatesv.AT&T, see
generallyRogerG. Noll & BruceM. Owen,TheAnticompetitiveUsesofRegulation:
United States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS
Uohn E. Kwoka& La"l'.'fence].Whiteeds.,2d ed.HarperCollins,1999).
11. SeegenerallyMF],supranote8.
12. In 1984,thesevenRBOCshadapproximately89%of locallines. GTE, a
companyindependentofAT&T, wasa monopolistin mostof theremaininglines.
AT&T's marketshareof locallineshadremainedalmostconstantsinceregulation
wasestablishedby the middle1930s.SeegenerallyNoll & Owen,supranote 10;
DavidGabel& DavidF.Weiman,HistoricalPerspectivesonCompetitiona dInterconnec-
tionbetweenLocalExchangeCarriers(Sept.1995)(manuscripton file withtheNYU
Annual Surveyof AmericanLaw);DavidGabel,Competitioni a NetworkIndustry:
TheTelePhoneIndustry,1894-1910,54].ECON.HISTORY543(1994).
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distancenetworkcapacityresultedin vigorouscompetitionin long
distanceservice,and, in 1995,theFederalCommunicationsCom-
missiondeclaredAT&T to be a "non-dominant"carrier.13Despite
networkownershipfragmentation,regulationsimposedmandatory
interconnectionamongall carriersof thePublicSwitchedTelecom-
municationsNetwork(hereinafter"PSTN"),guaranteeingintercon-
nectionandinteroperabilityamongthecarriers.
The 1981breakupof AT&T allowedeachof theRBOCsto re-
maina monopolistin its ownregionof the local telecommunica-
tions market. The logic of the breakupwas that, given the
technologyat thattime,competitionwaseconomicallyfeasiblein
longdistancetelecommunicationsmarketsbutnotsoin localtele-
communicationsmarkets.The DepartmentofJusticedeemedthe
localtelecommunicationsetworkto betooexpensivetoreplicate,
consideringtherevenuesthatit couldcreate,especiallyfrom resi-
dentialand smallbusinesscustomers.Assumingat the timethat
local telecommunicationswasa naturalmonopoly,theUSDOJ al-
lowedthe RBOCs to remainmonopolistsin their own respective
regionsfor localtelecommunications.14
A keyconcernarose.Sincelong distancecompanieshaveto
pickup fromanddelivercallsto localtelecommunicationscompa-
nies,therewasa dangerthat,if anRBOC wasallowedto alsopro-
videlongdistanceservice,thatRBOC couldleverageitsmonopoly
powerin thelocaltelecommunicationsmarkettoforecloseitsrivals
in long distanceservice.The RBOC wouldachievethisanti-com-
petitiveactionthroughtheimplementationof eithera verticalprice
squeezestrategyor a raisingrivals'coststrategy,asexplainedbelow.
The consentdecreethatformalizedtheAT&T breakup,theModifi-
cationof FinalJudgment (hereinafter"MFJ"), protectedthe long
distanceservicesmarketfrom theseanti-competitiveffectsby
prohibitingtheRBOCsfrom enteringthelongdistancemarket.15
13. In theMatterof MotionofAT&T Corp.to beReclassifiedasaNon-Domi-
nantCarrier,FCC No. 95-427(October12,1995).
14.The author'sconclusionsregardingthelogicof thebreakupandthebe-
lief thatlocaltelecommunicationswasanaturalmonopolyatthetimearebasedon
privatecommunicationof theauthorwithWilliamBaxter,AssistantAttorneyGen-
eralfor Antitrustandchiefarchitectof the settlementhatresultedin the 1981
breakupof AT&T. SeealsoNoll & Owen,supranote10.
15.The MFJ discussesin detailthe line-of-businessrestrictionsimposedon
RBOCs:
The secondtypeof restrictionimposedupontheOperatingCompaniesissaid
tobeintendedtopreventthemfromengagingin anynon-monopolybusiness
so as to eliminatethe possibilitythattheymightusetheir controloverex-
changeservicestogainanimproperadvantageovercompetitorsin suchbusi-
, ..
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In summary,aspart of the courtdecisionimplementingthe
1981breakupofAT&T, RBOCswerenotallowedto enterthelong
distanceservicemarket.16This prohibition aimed to prevent
RBOCsfrom (i) leveragingtheirmonopolypowerin thelocalmar-
ket to implementa "verticalpricesqueeze"of long distancerivals
and (ii) raisinglongdistancerivals'costsP I will firstdiscussverti-
cal leveragingin the contextof the post-AT&T-breakupmarket
structureandthewisdomof theMFJ in imposingbusinessrestric-
tionson theRBOCs. I will thenreturntotheverticalissuesrelated
to the Trinkocase. .
nesses.Thus, the OperatingCompanieswould not be permitted(1) to
manufactureor marketelecommunicationsproductsandcustomerpremises
equipment;(2) to provideinterexchangeservices,(3) to providedirectory
advertisingsuchastheYellowPages;(4) to provideinformationservices;and
(5) toprovideanyotherproductor serviceisnota "naturalmonopolyservice
actuallyregulatedbytariff."
MFJ, supranote8, at143.
16. Id.
17.The MFJ notesthatin thepresenceof line of businessrestrictionsthere
will be no incentiveandabilityfor AT&T (or the RBOCs) to engagein the an-
ticompetitiveconductalleged:
As indicatedin PartIV(A) supra,theabilityofAT&T toengagein anticompe-
titiveconc1uctstemslargelyfrom its controlof the local OperatingCompa-
nies. Absentsuchcontrol,AT&T will not havethe abilityto disadvantage
competitorsin theinterexchangeandequipmentmarkets.
For example,withthedivestitureof theOperatingCompaniesAT&T will
not beableto discriminateagainstintercitycompetitors,eitherbysubsidizing
its own intercityserviceswith revenuesfrom the monopolylocal exchange
services,or by obstructingits competitors'accessto the localexchangenet-
work. The local OperatingCompanieswill not be providinginterexchange
services,andtheywillthereforehaveno incentiveto discriminate.Moreover,
AT&T's competitorswillbeguaranteedaccessthatisequalto thatprovidedto
AT&T, and intercitycarriersthereforewill no longerbe presentedwith the
problemsthatconfrontedthemin thatarea. SeePartVIII, infra.
Id. at 165.
Moreover,theD.C. Circuitreaffirmed:
First. AT&T will no longerhavethe opportunityto providediscriminatory
interconnectiontocompetitors.The OperatingCompanieswill ownthelocal
exchangefacilities. Si.ncethesecompanieswill not be providing inter-
exchangeservices,theywill lackAT&T's incentiveto discriminate.Moreover,
theywill be requiredto provideall interexchangecarrierswith exchangeac-
cessthatis "equalin type,quality,andpriceto thatprovidedtoAT&T andits
affiliates."ProposedDecree,SectionII. SeePartVIII infra.
Id. at 171-72.
Seealsothediscussionof thelogicof theMFJ businessrestrictionsat id.,note13.
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B. Mihatis a VerticalPriceSqueezeandHowDoesit Leadtothe
FareclosureofDownstreamRivals byan UpstreamMonopolist?
I beginby introducingthenotionof a verticalpricesqueeze
throughanexample.Considera phonecallfromNewYorkCityto
BostonundertheMFJ restrictions.It iscarriedbyalocaltelephone
company,formallyknownasa local exchangecarrier (hereVer-
izon),withinNewYorkCityup totheswitchof alongdistancecom-
pany(whichI will denotein Figure1bySNYc),sayof AT&T. Then
the phone call is carriedby the long distancecompany(here
AT&T) toitsswitchin Boston(denotedbySBO)andhandedoverto
thelocalexchangecarrier(in thiscase,againVerizon)to be car-
ried to the terminatingdestination.The path of the phonecall
fromVerizonin NYCtoAT&T toVerizonin Bostonisshownin the
firstlineof Figure1. In termsof pricing,VerizonchargesAT&T an
"originatingaccessfee" for transportingthe call to AT&T's NYC
switchfrom the originatingparty.Verizon alsochargesAT&T a
"terminationaccessfee"for transportingthecallfromAT&T's Bos-
tonswitchto theterminatingparty.This is shownin line 2 of Fig-
ure 1. In thegraphicalrepresentation" " standsfor Verizon
while"1111111111"is for a longdistancecompany,suchasAT&T.
Figure 1: NYC to Boston Phone Call Under the MFJ
BusinessLine Restrictions
A ===============SN\'C======================SBO ====;==========B
Originationaccess + longdistancetransmission + Terminationaccess
Verizon
+ 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111+
] + [AT&T or othernon-Verizon]+ [ Verizon
Although to a final consumerthe long distancecall appearsto
be and is sold as a single product, it is in fact composedof three
components-origination access,long distance transmission,and
termination access. Origination access,carrying the call from the
consumer'slocation to the local switchof a long distancecompany,
is provided in NewYork City byVerizon at price POACCESS.Termina-
tion access,carrying the call from the long distanceswitchin Bos-
ton to its destination, is provided in Boston by Verizon at price
PTACCESS'Thus, the retail price charged to the customerby AT&T
for the long distancecall, PAB,is the sum of the pricesfor originat-
ing and terminating accessthat AT&T pays to Verizon plus the
AT&T price for long distancetransmission,PLD.TRANSMISSION,i.e.:
PAB ==PO.ACCESS +PLD.TRANSMISSION +PTACCESS
--- - -- n n_J. -u u u. - n nu.
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In a worldwithouttheMFJ businessline restrictionsthatpre-
cludetheRBOCsfrom operatingin thelong distancemarket,the
competitivesituationwouldbe dramaticallydifferent,as seenin
Figure2. Now, besidesthe traditionallong distancecompanies,
Verizonalsocarrieslongdistancecalls,andVerizonhastheadvan-
tageof providingoriginationandterminationaccessto itselfaswell
as to its long distancecompetitors.The upper part of Figure 2
showsthe long distancecall carriedby AT&T or anyother non-
Verizonlongdistancecarrier.The lowerpartof Figure2showsan
alternativewaytocarrythelongdistancecallin theabsenceof MFJ
restrictions:thelongdistancecall is carriedall theway,both in its
longdistancepartanditslocalpart,byVerizon.
Figure 2: NYC to Boston Phone Call Without the MFJ
BusinessLine Restrictions
A ================SNYC ====================SBO ===============B
Originationaccess + longdistancetransmission + Terminationaccess
Verizon
+ 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111+
] + [AT&T or othernon-Verizon]+ [ Verizon
+
Verizon ] + [ Verizon
+
] + [ Verizon
Verizon can now control the end-to-endprice of the long dis-
tancecall (PAB)aswell as the pricesof originating and terminating
access. Thus, a long distance company independent of Verizon
would now receiverevenuefor its long .distancetransmissionfrom
SNYCto SBO:
PAB - Po ACCESS- PTACCESS'
Notice that now the revenueof a pure long distancecompany
dependson three prices- PAB, POACCESS,and PTACCESS- whichare
all under the control ofVerizon and canbe manipulatedso thatthe
per unit revenuethatgoesto an independent long distancecarrier,
u- -
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PAB - PO.ACCESS- PT.ACCESS,18can be "squeezed"to a verysmall
amount.19
Foreclosure of competitorscan be achievedthrough a variety
of strategies. For example, the upstreammonopolist can reduce
the price of retail service,PAB.However,this maybe detrimentalto
its short run profits and therefore under some conditions maybe
undesirable. Alternatively,the upstreammonopolist can increase
the price of accessorigination, PO.ACCESS,overwhich it hasa monop-
oly. Any price PO.ACCESSabovethe monopolist's costwill place the
long distancerival at a profit disadvantage.2oIf the final products
are undifferentiated,eventhe smallestdeviationof the price of ac-
cessorigination above its cost will result in the foreclosure of an
equallyefficient long distancerival. That is becausethe accessmo-
nopolist chargesitself its own costsfor accessorigination while it
chargesthe higher price to long distancerivals.
Thus, the monopolist in the accessbottleneck, if allowed to
compete in the long distanceservicemarket, can leverageits mo-
nopoly power in the accessbottleneck to forecloserivalsfrom that
market,evenwhen the long distancemarketwould havebeen com-
petitive absent this foreclosure.21This potential anti-competitive
strategyhighlights the wisdomof the MFJ businessline restrictions
prohibiting the RBOCs from providing long distanceservice.
18. If thereishead-onpricecompetitionandlittleor no productdifferentia-
tion amonglongdistancecarriers,VerizoncontrolspricePAR,whichis thesameas
othercarrierscanchargefor thesameservice.If thereissignificantproductdiffer-
entiation,therecanbesmalldifferencesin thepricesthatVerizonandapurelong
distancecompanycancharge,butVerizoncanstill, throughitsownpricing,re-
ducethepricePA8availabletoa pure longdistancecompany.
19. Evenwhenthepricesfororiginatingandterminatingaccessareregulated
andevenwhentheyarenotunderthecontrolofVerizon,stilltheend-to-endprice
of long distanceis deregulated.Verizoncanoffera lowenoughend-to-endlong
distance price so that the difference PAR- POACCESS - PTACCESSis squeezed to a very
lowamount,andtherebyindependentlongdistancecompaniesareforeclosed.
20. In fact,accessoriginationand terminationhavebeentraditionallysetat
veryhighpricescomparedto costwiththeregulatoryobjectiveof subsidizingbasic
service.SeegenerallyNicholasEconomides,TelecommunicationsRegulation:An Intro-
duction(NET Inst.,WorkingPaper#04-02),availableathttp://www.stern.nyu.edu/
networks/Telecommunications_Regulation.pdf(on ilewiththeNYU AnnualSur-
veyof AmericanLaw).
21. The generaleveragingargumentdoesnot requirethatVerizon (or any
accessmonopolist)controlsbothoriginatingandterminatingaccess;for thegen-
eralargumentcontrolof accesson eithersideis sufficient.Sincein longdistance
telecommunicationstypicallythe originatingpartypays,it is generallyaccepted
thattheverticalpricesqueezewill be muchmorelikelywhentheoriginatingac-
'cessmonopolistalsoprovideslongdistanceservice.
,
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C. ForeclosureThroughRaisingRivals'Costs
In theprevioussectionwesawhowan upstreammonopolist
couldusepricingtoforecloseitsrivalsfroma downstreammarket
whenthe downstreamrivalsrequirethe useof the monopolized
input. I will nowshowthatanupstreammonopolist,if allowedin
thedownstream arket,canalsoforecloseitsdownstreamrivalsby
raisingtheircosts,byreducingthequalityof theirproduct,or by
otherwisereducingtheirprofitabilitythroughanti-competitiveac-
tions. I will showthat,in theabsenceof theMFJ restrictions,evenif
theregulatedmonopolistisforcedto sellatcost,it will stillbeable
to forecloseits downstreamcompetitorsif it can raise its rivals'
costs.
Continuingtheexampleof theprevioussection,supposenow
thatVerizonis forcedby regulatorsto sell accesspricesat cost.
ThenVerizoncannotdirectlysetapricefor suchservicesabovecost
asdiscussedabove.ButVerizoncanuseraisingrivals'costsstrate-
giesagainstitslongdistancecompetitors,suchasdelaysandquality
decreases,so that it increasesthe effectivecost of access,VER-
lZONPRRCo.ACCESS,to an amountaboveitsactualcost:22
VERiZONPRRCo.ACCESS>VERIZONCO.ACCESS.
Let the price of long distancetransmission(that is, routing the
call from SNYCto SBO)to each companybe AT&TPTRANSMISSIONand VER-
lZO:-/PTRANSMISSION,and assumethat the long distance rival is equally
efficient with Verizon:
AT&TPTRANSMISSION =VERIZONPTRANSMISSION.
Finally assumethat the termination accessprice PT.ACCESSfaced
by the two companiesis the same.23Then, facedwith higher effec-
tivecostfor accessorigination, equallyefficient long distancerivals
will have to charge a higher price-AT&TPAB-for the final service
than Verizon, VERiZONPAB,and will therefore be foreclosed from the
long distancemarket:
AT&TPAB=VERiZONPRRCo.ACCESS+AT&TPTRANSMISSION +PTACCESS =
VERIZONPRRCo.ACCESS+VERiZONPTRANSMISSION +PT.ACCESS >
VERiZONCO.ACCESS +VERIZONPTRANSMISSION +PT.ACCESS =VERiZONPAB'
I
I
I
I
22. Price whenopponentRaisesRivals'Costs (hereinafter"PRRC") repre-
sentstheeffectivepriceof themonopolizedinput toa downstreamrivalwhenthe
upstreammonopolistusesa strategythatraisesthecostsof rivalsor reducestheir
quality.VERlZONPRRCo.ACCESSis theeffectivecostof accessoriginauonfacedbylong
distanceservicerivalsasa resultof Verizon'sraisingrivals'costsactions.
23. The argumentis strengthenedif theRBOC is a monopolistin thetermi-
nationmarketaswell.
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Therefore,whenVerizonimplementsraisingrivals'costsstrate-
. gies,AT&T isforcedtosellitslongdistanceserviceabovetheprice
atwhichVerizonsellsit:
AT&TP AB > VERIZONP AB
Thus,in theabsenceof thebusinessline restrictionsimposed
bytheMFJ, anRBOC monopolistin accessoriginationcouldlever-
age its monopolyand forecloseits long distancerivals either
throughtheuseof pricestrategies,uchassettingthepriceof ac-
cessabovecost,or thoughstrategiesthatraisethecostsof competi-
tors,reducethequalityof theirproduct,or otherwisedisadvantage
theirprofitability.
D. SummaryoftheTelecommunicationsActof1996
In theyearsfollowingtheAT&T breakup,RBOCsmounteda
veryextensivelobbyingeffortin Congresstobeallowedto provide
long distanceservice,therebyabandoningthe restrictionsof the
MFJ. The resultinglawwastheTelecommunicationsAct of 1996,
whichallowedtheRBOCstoofferlongdistanceserviceundersome
conditions,whicharediscussedin detailbelow,and,at the same
time,attemptedto openthelocaltelecommunicationsetworkto
competition.As I discussbelow,the TelecommunicationsAct
failedmiserablytocreatecompetitionin localtelecommunications.
Additionally,asaresultof thepoorimplementationof theAct,ex-
istingcompetitionin longdistanceis likelyto diminish.24 .
The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996wasa landmarkreform
of theregulatoryenvironmentin telecommunications.25Its main
objectivesincluded(i) thecreationof competitionin localtelecom-
municationsand (ii) allowingentryof an RBOC in the long dis-
tance market once its local market had been opened to
competition.Despitethisrequirement,however,theTelecommu-
nicationsAct didnothaveanexplicitmeansof establishingcompet-
24.As explainedin detailbelow,RBOCswereallowedto enterthe long dis-
tancemarketin theirownregionswhileretaining,in mostcases,anearmonopoly
positionin residentialandsmallbusinesslocaltelecommunicationsmarkets.As a
result,throughimplementationofaverticalpricesqueezeandraisingrivals'costs
strategiesbytheRBOCs,AT&T announcedin thesummerof 2004thatit stopped
marketingboth localandlongdistanceservicesto residentialcustomers,andMC!
followeda similarstrategy,aswasrevealedin privatecommunicationbetweenthe
authorandMC! executives.The twolargestcompaniesin long distance,AT&T
and MC!,weresignificantlyweakened,andbecametakeovertargets.At the time
of thiswriting,SBChasjustacquiredAT&T, andVerizonis expectedto finishthe
acquisitionof MC! in January2006.SeegenerallyEconomides,supranote20.
25. For a deeperdiscussionof thebenefitsandcostsof telecommunications
regulation,seegenerallyEconomides,supranote20.
.
\.
u- -.. '" -'.u_--
390 NYU ANNUAL SURVEYOF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 61:379
itive conditionsin local telecommunicationsmarkets,such as
entrantsachievinga significantmarketshare,beforethe RBOCs
couldenterthelongdistancemarket.26Thus,theTelecommunica-
tionsAct didnotadequatelyguardagainstRBOCsleveragingtheir
local telecommunicationsmonopolypowerin the long distance
market.27
In 1996,the "lastmile" of the telecommunicationsnetwork
thatis closesto theconsumer,or the"localloop,"remainedabot-
tleneckcontrolledbyincumbentlocalexchangecarriers(hereinaf-
ter"ILECs"),RBOCs,GTE,andsmaller,typicallyruralindependent
telecommunicationscompanies.The TelecommunicationsAct
boldlyattemptedto introducecompetitionin thislastbottleneck,
whilealsoaimingto preservetheeffectivecompetitionthathadde-
velopedin thelong distancemarket.28
The basiclogic behind the TelecommunicationsAct wasto
breakthenetworkinto componentsand let everyonecompetein
everypart,aswellasin end-to-endservices.29To achievethis,the
TelecommunicationsAct mandated(i) interconnection;3o(ii) un-
bundling;31and (iii) non-discrimination.32Moreover,it tookaway
someof theincumbents'advantagesthatarisepurelyfrom histori-
calreasonsby(i) mandatingthatincumbentsleaseunbundlednet-
work elementsto entrantsat cost-basedprices;33(ii) mandating
wholesaleprovisionof any servicepresentlyprovided by the
ILECs;34and (iii) imposingnumberportability.35To preservecom-
petitionin long distance,theTelecommunicationsAct attempted
to ensurethatmonopolypowerin thelocalexchangewasnot ex-
portedto othermarkets.
Arguingthatwiththetechnologyavailableatthetime,entryin
localtelecommunicationswasuneconomic,Congressdefinedways
for entrantsto sharetheexistinglocalinfrastructuremonopolized
26. SeegeneraUyTelecommunicationsAct, 47D.S.C.§§ 251-72.
27. For an extensivediscussionof the TelecommunicationsAct, see
Economides,supranote20;NicholasEconomides,U.S.TelecommunicationsToday,
in IS MANAGEMENTHANDBOOK(CarolV. Brown& HeikkiTopi eds.,AuerbachPub-
lications2003)availableathttp://www.stem.nyu.edu/networks/DS2002.pdf.
28. SeegenerallyEconomides,supranote20;Economides,supranote27.
29. Economides,supranote27.
30. TelecommunicationsAct,47D.S.C.§§ 251(a), (c)(2) (1996).
31. 47D.S.C.§§ 251(c)(3), (c)(6).
32. 47D.S.C.§§ 251(b)(I), (b)(3), (c)(2)(D), (c)(3), (c)(4)(b), 252(d)(I).
33. 47D.S.C.§ 251(c)(2).
34. 47D.S.C.§ 251(c)(4)(a).
35. 47D.S.C.§ 251(a)(2).
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by RBOCsand GTE.36Entryin localtelecommunicationswithout
leasingor sharingtheexistingnetworkwasinherentlymorediffi-
cultthanentryin thelongdistancemarket.Amongthefactorsthat
contributedto thesedifficultieswere:
(i) High capitalrequirements-Buildingthe "local loop" that
connectedthecustomertothenetworkrequiredmuchmore
capitalper customerthancreatinga longdistancenetwork.
(ii) Location-specificonstraints-Whilemanyelements/com-
ponentsof thelongdistancenetworkweremoveable,much
of the investmentin thelocal exchangehasto be madeat
specificlocations.37
To facilitateentryin local telecommunicationsmarkets,the
Act imposedmandatoryinterconnectionamongtelecommunica-
tionsnetworks,unbundledpricing,non-discrimination,and num-
ber portability. In particular, Section 251(c)(2) mandated
interconnection:
(A) for the transmissionand routingof telephoneexchange
serviceandexchangeaccess;
(B) atanytechnicallyfeasiblepoint;
(C) thatisatleastequalin qualitytothatprovidedbythelocal
exchangecarrierto itselfor toanysubsidiary,affiliate,or
anyotherpartytowhichthecarrierprovidesinterconnec-
tion;and
(D) on rates,terms,andconditionsthatarejust, reasonable,
andnondiscriminatory,in accordancewiththetermsand
36. The FederalCommunicationsCommissionput it asfollows:
BecauseanincumbentLEC currentlyservesvirtuallyallsubscribersin itslocal
servingarea,an incumbentLEC haslittleeconomicincentiveto assistnew
entrantsin theireffortsto securea greatershareof thatmarket.An incum-
bentLEC alsohastheabilityto acton itsincentiveto discourageentryand
robustcompetitionbynot interconnectingitsnetworkwiththenewentrant's
networkor byinsistingonsupracompetitivepricesor otherunreasonablecon-
ditionsfor terminatingcallsfromthe entrant'scustomersto theincumbent
LEC's subscribers.
Congressaddressedtheseproblemsin the 1996Act by mandatingthat
themostsignificanteconomicimpedimentstoefficiententryintothemonop-
olizedlocalmarketmustbe removed.The incumbentLECs haveeconomies
of density,connectivity,andscale;traditionally,thesehavebeenviewedascre-
atinganaturalmonopoly.Aswepointedoutin ourNPRM,thelocalcompeti-
tion provisionsof the Act requirethat theseeconomiesbe sharedwith
entrants.
FederalCommunicationsCommission,FirstReportandOrder,FCC No. 96-325,at,10-11(August1, 1996).
37. SeegenerallyEconomides,supranote20;Economides,supranote27.
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conditions of the agreementand the requirementsof this
sectionand section252.38
Section 251(c)(3) mandatedunbundled pricing, that is, offer-
ing for salenetwork elementsat "rates,terms,and conditions that
are just, reasonable,and nondiscriminatory."39To implement in-
terconnection and unbundling, an incumbent was required to al-
low for physical collocation of equipment at its premises.4O
Moreover, all companieshad the duty to provide number portabil-
ity, so that consumers could keep their phone numbers if they
changedtheir local serviceprovider.41
The Act introducedtwo novelwaysof entry,besidesentry
throughthe installationof newfacilities.42The first wayallowed
entryin the retailingpartof the telecommunicationsbusinessby
requiringILECs to sell,atwholesalepricesto entrants,anyretail
servicethattheyoffered.Suchentrywasessentiallylimitedto the
retailingpartof themarket.43
Thesecondandmostsignificantnovelwayof entryintroduced
by theAct wasthroughtheleasingof UNEs from incumbents.In
particular,the Act requiresthat ILECs (i) unbundle their net-
works;44and (ii) thattheyoffer for leaseto entrantsnetworkcom-
ponents (unbundlednetworkelements,"UNEs") "at cost plus
reasonableprofit."45Thus,theAct envisionedthetelecommunica-
tionsnetworkas a decentralizednetworkof interconnectednet-
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
38. TelecommunicationsAct,47V.S.C.§ 251(c)(2) (1996).
39. 47V.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
40. 47V.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
41. 47V.S.C.§ 251(b)(2).
42. SeeFederalCommunicationsCommission,FirstReportand Order,FCC
No. 96-325,at ~ 12(August1, 1996).
43. The Act statesthatpricesfor resoldwholesaleserviceswill be setasfol-
lows:"a Statecommissionshalldeterminewholesalerateson the basisof retail
rateschargedto subscribersfor thetelecommunicationsservicerequested,exclud-
ingtheportionthereofattributabletoanymarketing,billing,collection,andother
coststhatwill be avoidedby thelocalexchangecarrier."47 V.S.C. § 252(d)(3).
Notice that,evenif all avoidedcostsareappropriatelyidentifiedand deducted
from finalprices,the ILEC is stillableto collectthe pre-entryretailprofitfrom
resoldwholesaleservices.
44. 47V.S.C. §§ 251(c)(3), (c)(6).
45. The FCC andStateRegulatoryCommissionshaveinterpretedthesewords
to meanTotalElementLongRun Incre'mentalCostwhichis thefo.rwardlooking,
long run, minimizedeconomiccostof an unbundledelementand includesthe
competitivereturnon capital.SeeFederalCommunicationsCommission,FirstRe-
port andOrder,FCC No. 96-325,at § VII (August1, 1996).'.
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works.The FederalCommunicationsCommissiondefinedthekey
UNEs asthe"localloop,"localswitching,andlocaltransport.46
Entrythroughleasingof UNEswouldbeuneconomicalunless
pricesfor the leasedelementsweresetat appropriatepricesthat
imitatedcompetitiveprices.TheAct orderedthatpricingof inter-
connectionor unbundlednetworkelements:
(A) shallbe
(i) basedon thecost(determinedwithoutreferenceto a
rate-of-returnor otherrate-basedproceeding)of pro-
viding the interconnectionor network.element
(whicheveris applicable),and
(ii) nondiscriminatory,and
(B) mayincludea reasonableprofit.47
The appropriatepricingof leasedUNEs,transport,andaccess
terminationwascruciallyimportantfor promotingeffectivecompe-
tition. The extentto andthespeedwithwhichcompetitionwould
developdependedcriticallyon havingpricesfor UNEs andservices
thatwereascloseto efficienteconomic ostsaspossible.The more
pricesexceededefficienteconomic osts,thelessentrytherewould
be. The lessentrytherewas,thelesslikelyit wouldbethateffective
competitionwoulddevelopin localexchangemarkets,and,if effec-
tivecompetitiondid develop,it wouldhappenmoreslowly.
In implementingthe TelecommunicationsAct, the FCC
adoptedthe long-run,forward-lookingeconomiccostasthemea-
sureof appropriatecosts,or TotalElementLong RunIncremental
Costs(hereinafter"TELRIC").48This costmeasurefulfilledboth
therequirementof theTelecommunicationsAct thatthe ratesfor
UNEs benondiscriminatory,andtheneedfor thatrequiremento
applynot onlyto the rateschargedto differententrants,but also
betweentheentrantsandtheincumbent.49
TELRIC is the sumof thecostsfor all economicallyefficient
inputsrequiredto supplythe UNE.50TELRIC hasthe following
features:(1) it is aforward-lookingeconomiccost;(2) it is thelow-
estcostto providetheservice;(3) it is a long-runcost;(4) it is an
incrementalcost;(5) it includesacompetitivereturnon capital;(6)
it excludesmonopolyrents;(7) it excludescrosssubsidiesof any
46. Seeid.at§ 51.319(August1, 1996).
47. 47V.S.C.§ 252(d)(1).
48. SeeFederalCommunicationsCommission,First Reportand Order,FCC
No. 96-325,at § VII (August1, 1996).
49. [d. SeealsoEconomides,supranote20;Economides upranote27.
50. FederalCommunicationsCommission,FirstReportandOrder,FCC No.
96-325,\at§ F 51.505(August1, 1996).
394 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vo1.61:379
kind; and (8) in general,it reflectscostdifferencesamonggeo-
graphicregions.51 .
UsingTELRIC asthe basisfor pricesperformsseveralfunc-
tions,which,in combination,guarantee conomicefficiency.First,
it givestherightsignalto consumersmakingpurchasingdecisions
amonggoods,becausethesedecisionsare madeon the basisof
whatsocietymustgiveup to supplythesegoods.In otherwords,it
achievesallocativefficiency.Second,sucha pricedirectsproduc-
tion to themostefficient,lowest-costuppliers,becausethesepro-
ducerscan offer the lowestprices. In other words,it achieves
productiveefficiency.Third, it givestheappropriatesignaltofirms
makingdecisionsof investment,entry,and exit,whicharemade
purelyon the basisof forward-lookingcosts.In other words,it
achievesdynamicefficiency.52
Pricesbasedon TELRIC plus reasonableprofit,asmandated
by theAct, for theleasingof UNEs are clearlyabovethe present
costof thelocaltelecommunicationsetwork.53The presentcost
of the local telecommunicationsetworkreflectsthe costof pre-
sent-dayresourcesthatwouldbenecessaryto constructsucha net-
work.54Thus,fromaneconomicpointof viewit is theappropriate
costmeasure,andit wascorrectlyadoptedbytheFCC.55The in-
cumbentlocalexchangecarriershadarguedthattheappropriate
costmeasurewouldbethehistoricor "embedded"costof thenet-
work-that is, the cost of the networkwheneverit was con-
structed.56However,thehistoricconstructioncostof thenetwork
doesnot generallycorrespondto the costof the presentdayre-
sourcesneededto constructsuch a network,57There could be
manyreasonsfor thisphenomenon;I highlighttwothatshowhow
inappropriateit wouldbetouse-historicosts,especiallyih thecase
of localtelecommunications.
51. ld.
52. SeegenerallyEconomides,supranote20;Economidessupranote27.
53. SeeFederalCommunicationsCommission,FirstReportand Order,FCC
No. 96-325,at § VII (August1, 1996).
54. Seeid.at § F 51.505.
55. ld. The FCC did not calculatethecostof themostefficientcurrentnet-
work. Insteadit allowedfor the locationsof switchesand centralofficesof the
incumbentsto befixedandcalculatedthecostof creatinga present-daynetwork
giventheselocations.Sincetheselocationscouldalsobe optimizedin themost
efficientnetwork,thecostof thenetworkascalculatedbytheFCC washigherthan
thatof the mostefficientnetwork.Becauseit kepttheold locationsof switches
and centralofficesfixed,the networkdesignapproveaby the FCC wascalleda
"scorchednode"networkdesign.
56. Seeid.
57. ld.
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First, technologicalchangeimplies verysignificant cost reduc-
tions in the provision of telecommunicationsservices.58 For exam-
ple, a keyfunction in telecommunicationsis switchingand routing
calls appropriately. Since the 1950s,computers have performed
this function and technologicalprogresshasbeen immense. To say
that the appropriate cost todayof a present day PC is billions of
dollars because producing a computer with the corresponding
computing power wou~dcost that much in 1955or 1960is totally
absurd. The incumbents' proposal of using historic costs in the
face of fast technologicalchapgeis equallyabsurd.
Second, telecommunicationscompanieswere regulated for a
significant period according to "rate of return regulation." Very
briefly thatmeantthata company'sprofitscould not exceeda "cap-
ital base"multiplied bya "rateof return," and thatthe companywas
therefore guaranteedto recover its network infrastructure invest-
ments.59The regulator set the rate of return and the companyad-
justed its capitalbaseand pricesso thatitsprofil:$would not exceed
the capital base times the rate of return.60 An expansion of the
capitalbaseby a dollar allowsthe companyto increaseits allowed
profits. Since this regulation guaranteesrecovery of investment
and allows for expansion of profits when the capital base is in-
creased,it is clear thata companyhas an incentiveto keep its ~api-
tal basehigh.61 Thus, the incumbent local exchangecarriers have
historicallykept their capitalbasehigh, and the key elementof this
capitalbaseis the local networkinfrastructure.62Therefore, evenif
historical costswere the appropriate measureof costs (which they
are not) the historical costsof the incumbentswould have to be
adjusteddownwardsignificantlybecauseof the distortions caused
by the rate of return regulation.63
The TelecommunicationsAct allowedfor the entry of RBOCs
into the long distance market after they opened their local ex-
58. SeegenerallyEconomides,supranote20;Economides,supranote27.
59. SeeHaxveyAverch& LelandL. Johnson,BehavioroftheFirmUnderRegula-
toryConstraint,52AM.ECON.REv.1052,1053-69(1962);Noll& Owen,supranote
10.
60.Averch&Johnson, supranote59.
61. Seeid.at 1053-69(discussingtheseandadditionaldistortionscreatedby
rateof returnregulation).
62. AT&T long distancerepeatedlyadjusteditsbook valuedownwardafter
competitiondevelopedin the long distancemarketto eliminatethe distortion
causedby therateof returnregulation.The RBOCsandGTE havenot doneso.
63. Moreover,it is likelythatincumbentlocalexchangecarriershavealready
recoveredtheoriginalcostof thevastmajorityof the physicalplantthatwasin.
place\>y1996.
,
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changenetworkto competition.64Thus,fromthepointof viewof
an RBOC, long distanceentrywassupposedto be therewardfor
allowingcompetitionin the local exchangeandforfeitinga local
exchangemonopoly.The TelecommunicationsAct wasbasedon
thebeliefthattheindividualprivateincentivesof theRBOCswould
be sufficientto drivetheprocess.Thus, theTelecommunications
Act didnotimposepenaltiesfor delayor non-compliance.Thishas
provedto beaveryseriousdeficiency.65Congressthoughtthatthe
"carrot"of entryintothelongdistancemarketwouldbea sufficient
incentiveto compelRBOCsto opentheir localnetworks.Events
haverevealedthatCongresserredin thisassumption;RBOCs'be-
haviorhasshownthattheypreferrednot to opentheir localnet-
workandinsteadtopaythepriceof stayingoutof longdistancefor
a while.
In summary,amongotherrequirements,theTelecommunica-
tionsAct:
(i) affirmedthe mandatoryinterconnectionof telecommunica-
tionsnetworksthatcomprisedthePublicSwitchedTelecom-
municationsNetwork;
(ii) requiredunbundlingof eachlocal telecomnetworkandits
pricing;
(iii) imposedtheobligationon RBOCs to leaseat costplusrea-
sonableprofittheunbundledpartsof thelocaltelecommuni-
cationsnetwork,calledUNEs, to anyentrant;66
(iv) imposedtheobligationon RBOCstoprovidetoentrantsata
wholesalediscountanyserviceit providesto thepublic;
(v) imposedotherdutieson RBOCs,suchasnon-discrimination,
numberportability,and co-locationof equipment,.so that
RBOCswouldnotleveragetheirmonopolypowerin thelocal
telecommunicationsetwork;
(vi). allowedeachRBOC toenterin thelongdistanceservicemar-
ket in its servicearea(whereit usedto havea legalmonop-
01y)67once the RBOC unbundledthe local network,met
non-discriminatoryandotherrequirements,andshowedthat
its entryin longdistancewas"in thepublicinterest."
64. TelecommunicationsAct,47 U.S.C.§ 271(1996).
65. SeegenerallyEconomides,supranote20;Economides upranote27.
66. In broadcategories,theUNEs were(i) the"localloop"theconnectsthe
customerpremiseswiththelocalswitch;(ii) localswitchingservices;and (Hi)local
transportseIVices.
67. The Act alsoallowedimmediateRBOC entryin longdistancein locations
thatwere~otin itsservicearea.See47 U.S.C.§§ 271-72.
,.
2005]VERTICAL LEVERAGEAND THE SACRIFICE PRINCIPLE 397
E. Implementationof theTelecommunicationsAct
Therewereverysignificantdelaysin theimplementationofthe
Act anda numberof legalchallenges.Therewerelong delaysin
the implementationof electronicsystemsthatcould easilyand at
lowcostswitchlargenumbersof customeraccountsto entrants,as
is regularlydonefor longdistanceservice.Therewerealsosignifi-
cantcomplaintsthatincumbentmonopolistsin the local market
wereraisingthecostsof theirrivalsor loweringtheirrivals'quality.
Allegationsincludedtemporarilydisconnectingcustomerswhohad
switchedtheirlocaltelecommunicationsserviceprovider,andeven
foreclosingthesecustomersaltogether.68
By2004,RBOCswereclearedin all statesbytheFCC to enter
thelongdistanceservicemarket,andthishadoccurredbeforelocal
entrantshad acquiredsignificantmarketsharesin mostareasthat
wouldnoticeablychallengethemonopolisticor dominantposition
of theincumbentlocalexchangecarriers(RBOCsandGTE in their
present,after-mergerscombinations).69
By2003to2004,localexchangecarriersofferedbundlesof lo-
calandlongdistanceservicesin manyareas.In moststates,RBOCs
wereallowedto sell"buckets"of localandlong distanceminutes,
wherethecustomercoulduseanyminutein thebucketeitherasa
local or asa long distanceminute. Becausethe originationand
terminationaccesspricessignificantlyexceededtJ;1eircosts,thein-
troductionof interchangeablebucketsof local and long distance
minutescreatedadditionaldisadvantagesfor companiesthatpartic-
ipatedonly in the long distancetransmissionof calls. The local
exchangecarrierwouldchargeitselffor thecostof originatingand
terminatingaccess,butit wouldchargeindependentlongdistance
companiesignificantlyhigherpricesfor originatingandterminat-
68. See,e.g.,theCaliforniaPublicUtilitiesCommissioninvestigationproceed-
ingsin MCI Telecomm.Corp.v. Pac.Bell, No. 96-12-026(Cal. P.U.C. Sept.24,
1997);Cal.P.U.C.Decision01-05-087(May24,2001);andLandmarkCases,http:/
/ www.blechercollins.com/CM/LandmarkCases/LandmarkCases32.asp(discussing
CaltechInt'l TelecomCorp.v. Pac.Bell,No. 97-2105(N.D. Cal.2000)).Also,the
Trinkocasewasbasedon factSthat emergedfrom an earlier investigationof
NYNEX's (Verizon'spredecessor's)violationsof itS interconnectionagreement
withAT&T bytheNewYorkPublicServiceCommission.NYNEX paid$10million
to AT&T and othercompetitorsfor lossesarisingfromviolationsof itSintercon-
nectionagreement.SeeVerizonCommunicationsInc. v. LawOfficesof CurtisV.
Trinko, 540U.S.398,402-05(2004). .
69. By 2004,Bell Atlantic,NYNEX and GTE havebeencombinedto form
Verizon,SBC hasabsorbedAmeritech,PacificBell,andSNET (SouthernNewEn-
glandTelephone),US WesthasbeenboughtbyQuest,andBellSouthremainsthe
onlyRBOGwhichhasnotmergedsince1981.
~
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ing access.Thus, the iridependentlong distancecompaniesw:ould
face higher costs and were directly subject to a vertical price
squeeze. The main hope for competition remained the possibility
that extensiveentry into local markets (including the marketsfor
originating and terminatingaccess)would significantlyerode the
mo~opolyor dominant position of the incumbent local exchange
carners.
There wasa tremendousamountof litigation in the implemen-
tation of the 1996Act. Besidesthe litigation resulting from imple-
mentation in eachstate,the RBOCs and GTE challenged the FCC
rules. The Supreme Court invalidatedthe first set of FCC rules in
AT&T Corp.v. Iowa UtilitiesBoard.7OThe Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit invalidatedmuch of the second set of FCC rules in
UnitedStatesTelecomAss'n v. FederalCommunicationsCommission.71
The FCC consolidatedthe remand with its second triennial review
of the rules implementing the Act.72
Much of the subsequentlitigation focused on the issueof "im-
pairment," as described in Section 251(d)(2)(B) of the Act. Sec-
tion 251(d)(2) reads:
(2) In determining what network elementsshould be made
availablefor purposes of subsection (c)(3), the Commis-
sion shall consider,at a minimum, whether
(A) accessto such networkelementsasare proprietary in
nature is necessary;and
(B) thefailure to provideaccessto suchnetworkelements
would impair the ability of the telecommunications
carrier seeking accessto provide the servicesthat it
seeksto offer.73
Mter losing the first appeal, the FCC defined impairment as
follows: an entrant competitivelocal exchangecarrier (hereinafter
"CLEC") would "be impaired when lack of accessto an incumbent
[local exchangecarrier] network elementposesa barrier or barri-
ers to entry,including operational and economic barriers,that are
likely to makeentryinto a marketuneconomic."74In the appealof
the secondtriennial reviewof the FCC, referred to generallyas the
USTA II decision, the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC's findings
70. 525U.S. 366(1999).
71. 290F.3d415(D.C.Cir. 2002).
72. SeeReportandOrder andOrderon RemandandFurtherNoticeof Pro-
posedRulemaking,Reviewof theSection251UnbundlingObligationsof Incum-
bentLocalExchangeCarriers,FCC No. 03-36(Feb.20,2003)[hereinafterTROJ.
73. TelecommunicationsAct,47U.S.C.§ 251(d)(2) (1996).
74.,TRO, supranote72,at~84.
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thatentrantswouldbe impairednationwidewith respectto mass
marketswitching.75Asaresultof thisdecisionandtheFCC'ssubse-
quentorderon remand,76RBOCsdonothaveto setup newleases
of the"localswitching"UNE atpricesthatreflectcostplusreasona-
ble profit. As an immediateconsequenceof USTAII, in thesum-
mer of 2004,AT&T, the largestlong distancecarrier,stopped
marketingboth localand long distanceserviceto residentialcus-
tomer~.SBCacquiredAT&T in November2005,andVerizonis ex-
pectedtofinishtheacquisitionof MCI in January2006.Asaresult
of theseacquisitions,therewill be a significantreductionin the
numberandcapabilitiesofindependentlongdistancecompetitors,
resultingin likelypriceincreasesin longdistanceservice.
In summary,theTelecommunicationsAct failedmiserablyin
twoof itsmainobjectives.First,it failedto createcompetitionin
local telecommunications.Second,the TelecommunicationsAct
wassupposedto guardagainstRBOCsleveragingtheirmonopoly
powerin local telecommunicationsserviceto the long distance
market.It compktelyfailedin thistoo. The failureof theActwas
mainlyin itsimplementation.TheActdidnotimposepunishments
andpenaltiesfor delaysin implementation;it harboredtheseedsof
its owndestruction.The Act assumedthattheRBOCs,following
theirownincentives,wouldallowcompetitionin localtelecommu-
nicationstoflourishsothattheywouldhaveguaranteedentryinto
the long distancemarket. But since there were no specific
benchmarkson the degreeof necessarycompetitionbefore an
RBOC couldenterthelongdistancemarket,theRBOCscalculated
correctlythat theycould enter long distanceserviceevenwhen
competitionin thelocalservicemarketwasminimal,and,in fact,
the RBOCs enteredlong distancein all stateswithoutsignificant
competitionin localservice.Thus,thefailureof theTelecommuni-
cationsActwastoasignificantextenttheresultof insufficientatten-
tiontotheverticaleveragingthatamonopolistor near-monopolist
RBOC could exerton entrantsthatneededto leasepartsof the
RBOC localtelecommunicationsetworkto produceandselllocal
telephoneservic~s.
As I will showbelow,a monopolistRBOC canleverageitsmo-
nopolypowerin thelocaltelecommunicationsetworktoforeclose
rivalsandpotentialrivalsin localtelecommunicationsservicewho
75. SeeUnited StatesTelecomAss'n v. FederalCommunicationsComm'n,
359F.3d554,594-95(D.C.Cir. 2004).
76. Order on Remand,In the Matterof UnbundledAccessto NetworkEle-
ments,Reviewof the Section251UnbundlingObligationsof IncumbentLocal
Exchange,Carriers,FCC No. 04-290(Dec.15,2004).
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needto leasethemonopolist'snetworkto compete.This issueof
monopolyleveragingwas well understoodat the time of the
breakupof AT&T in 1981,wherebyRBOCsweregrantedmonopo-
liesin local telecommunicationsmarketswhilecompetitiondevel-
opedandintensifiedin longdistance.As partof thecourtdecision
implementingthebreakupof AT&T, RBOCswerenot allowedto
enterthe long distanceservicemarket.As I haveexplained,this
prohibitionwascreatedtopreventRBOCsfrom (i) leveragingtheir
monopolypowerin thelocalmarketand implementinga "vertical
pricesqueeze"on long distancerivals;and (ii) raising(longdis-
tance)rivals'costs.
We will returnto theverticalissuesrelatedto the Trinkocase
aftersummarizingtheSupremeCourtdecisionon Trinko.
III.
SUMMARYOF THE SUPREME COURT
DECISION IN TRINKO
The LawOfficesof CurtisV.Trinko wasa localtelecommuni-
cationsservicecustomerof AT&T thatsuedVerizon,allegingthat
Verizon was implementingan anti-competitiveschemeagainst
AT&T andotherlocalcompetitorsothatVerizoncouldpreserve
itsmonopolyin localtelecommunicationsservice.77Theallegations
includeddiscriminationin fulfillingcustomertransferorderstoen-
trants.The districtcourtdismissedall claimsandacceptedtheview
of thedefendantsthata breachof theinterconnectionagreement
betweenVerizonandAT&T shouldbe remediedthroughan ad-
ministrativeprocess;antitrustlitigationwouldonlydisrupttheregu-
latoryprocessof implementationof theTelecommunicationsAct.78
The SecondCircuit Court of Appealsreversedthe districtcourt's
dismissalof Trinko'santitrustclaim.79It notedthat"it is unlikely
thatallowingantitrustsuitswouldsubstantiallydisruptthe regula-
tory proceedingsmandatedby the TelecommunicationsAct."8O
Moreover,theSecondCircuitstated,"whileideally,theregulatory
processalonewouldbe enoughto bringcompetitionto the local
phoneservicemarkets,it is possiblethattheantitrustlawswill be
77. Trinko suedNYNEX,whichBellAtlanticeventuallyabsorbed.BellAtlan-
tic mergedwithGTE to createVerizon.VerizonCommunicationsInc. v. LawOf-
ficesof CurtisV. Trinko, 540U.S. 398,402-05(2004).
. 78. LawOfficesofCurtisV. Trinko.v.BellAtl.Corp.,123F. Supp.2d738,745
(S.D.N.Y.2000),rev'd,305F.3d89 (2dCir. 2002),rev'd,540U.S.98 (2004).
79. LawOfficesofCurtisV. Trinkov.BellAt!.Corp.,305F.3d89,113(2dCir.
2002),rev'd,540U.S. 98 (2004).
80. Id. at 111.
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neededto supplementhe regulatoryscheme,especiallywith re-
spectto injurycausedto consumers."81AllowingTrinko'santitrust
claimto continue,theSecondCircuitheldthatVerizon'sfailureto
leasepartsof itslocalnetworktorivalsaccordingtotherulesof the
TelecommunicatibnsAct could resultin monopolizationonceall
factsaretakeninto consideration.82
. The SupremeCourt'sTrinkodecisionis organizedin four
parts.Part I describesthecomplaintandproceduralhistoryof the
case.83PartII considers"whateffect(if any)the1996Acthasupon
theapplicationof traditionalantitrustprinciples,"84andconcludes
that "the 1996Act preservesclaimsthatsatisfyexistingantitrust
standards[but]doesnotcreatenewclaimsthatgobeyondexisting
antitruststandards."85Part III held that"Verizon'sallegedinsuffi-
cientassistancein theprovisionof serviceto rivalsis nota recog-
nizedantitrustclaimunder [theSupreme]Court'sexistingrefusal-
to-dealprecedents."86Part IV considerswhetherto extendthe
Court'sexistingrefusal-to-dealprecedentsto recognizea § 2 claim
for failureto complywith the requirementsof the 1996Act, and
concludesthatsuchanextensionisunwarrantedgiventheexisting
regulatorystructuredesignedto enforcethe requirementsof the
1996Act.87
In particular,theSupremeCourtheldandreasonedasfollows:
AlthoughtheTelecommunicationsAct of 1996hasan anti-
trust"savingsclause,"it doesnot createa differentenviron-
mentthanthecustomaryonein theapplicationof antitrust
law.8s
(ii) As iswellestablishedin antitrustradition,monopolybyitself
isnotillegal,andliabilityrequiresanti-competitiveconduct.89
(i)
81. Id. at 112.
82. Id. at 113.
83. Trinka,540U.S.at 402-05.
84. Id. at 405.
85. Id. at 407.
86. Id. at 410.
87. Id. at 411-16.
88. Id. at 405-07.
89. SpecificallytheSupremeCourt notes:
The merepossessionof monopolypower,and the concomitantchargingof
monopolyprices,is not onlynot unlawful;it is an importantelementof the
free-marketsystem.The opportunityto chargemonopolyprices-at leastfor
ashortperiod-is whatattracts"businessacumen"in thefirstplace;it induces
risktakingthatproducesinnovationandeconomicgrowth.To safeguardthe
incentiveto innovate,thepossessionof monopolypowerwill not be found
unlawfulunlessit is accompaniedbyan elementof anticompetitiveconduct.
Id. at407.
..
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(iii) Antitrustlawonlyrarelyrequirescooperationof amonopolist
withrivalsbecause:
(a) it canleadto collusion;9°
(b) mayretardinnovation;and91
(c) mayreduceinvestment.92
(iv) In Trinko,unlikein AspenSkiing,themonopolistVerizondid
notvoluntarilyselltheproduct(hereleasedUNEs) andthen
stopsellingit or discriminateagainstrivals.Insteadthemar-
ketfor leasedUNEs in Trinkowascreatedbyregulatoryfiat.
AspenSkiingwasalready"ator neartheouterboundaryof § 2
liability."93
(v) The "EssentialFacilities"doctrine has no applicationin
Trinkoandthereis "no needto eitherrecognize[theessen-
tial facilitiesdoctrine]or.torepudiateit here."94
(vi) The Courtshouldnotgetinvolvedin thedetailsof regulatory
matters.95
IV.
ISSUESAND PROBLEMSARISING FROM
THE TRINKODECISION
There are severalaspectsof this decisionaboutwhich I am
troubledasaneconomist.First,theCourtappearsconcernedthat
compellingnegotiationbetweencompetitorscould leadto collu-
sion:"Moreover,compellingnegotiationbetweencompetitorsmay
facilitatethesupremeevilof antitrust:collusion."96However,in
thecaseof negotiationbetweenanincumbentmonopolistlocalex-
changecarrier(hereVerizon)andanentrant(hereAT&T) thereis
no possibilityof collusionbecauseonlythe incumbenthasthere-
source(thelocalexchangenetwork)overwhich thereis negotia-
tion whiletheentrant(s)hasno suchnetwork.Thus,thereis no
90. "Moreover,compellingnegotiationbetweencompetitorsmayfacilitate
thesupremeevilof antitrust:collusion."Id. at 408.
91. This isimpliedbyallowingmonopolypowerandmonopolypricesto pro-
videincentivestoinnovate:"Tosafeguardtheincentiveto innovate,thepossession
of monopolypowerwill not be found unlawfulunlessit is accompaniedby an
elementof anticompetitiveconduct."Id. at407.
92. 'JudicialoversightundertheShermanActwouldseemdestinedtodistort
investmentandleadto a newlayerof interminablelitigation,atopthevarietyof
litigationroutesalreadyavailabletoandactivelypursuedbycompetitiveLECs." Id.
at 414.
93. Id. at 409.
94. Id. at411.
95. Id. at411-15.
96. I~.at408.
- -u-u
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possibilityof negotiationleadingtoa collusivearrangementamong
sellersofsubstitutes.Heretherelationshipbetweentheincumbent
andanentrantispurelyarelationshipbetweenabuyerandaseller,
in which negotiationis standardpracticeand doesnot typically
raiseantitrustconcerns.97Moreover,theTelecommunicationsAct
imposestheobligationon thepartiesto negotiate,98andif theSu-
premeCourt reallybelievedthatsuchnegotiationsraisedantitrust
concerns,it shouldhavepointedto other problems,suchasthe
Act's explicit requirementthat carriers negotiate. Thus, the
Court'sconcernovercompellingnegotiationis misguided.
Second,the Courtis concernedthattheleasingrequirement
imposedbyregulationmayreduceinvestment.99To theextentthat
antitrustlawisusefulin increasingthesocialbenefitsfromtheexis-
tenceand operationof markets,it shouldbe pointedout thatin-
creasingsocialbenefitsfrom marketsdoesnot necessarilyimply
thatinvestmentshouldbe maximized.In fact,often,marketsand
tradehelpreduceinvestmenttothebenefitof society.In thecase
of localtelecommunications,it waswellunderstoodbyCongressin
passingtheTelecommunicationsAct of 1996thatthecostof repli-
catinglocalnetworkswouldbeprohibitive.The pointof theTele-
communicationsActwasto createcompetitionwithoutduplicating
localnetworks.Thatis,Congressexplicitlyandwithfull considera-
tion of thefactschosea regulatoryframeworkthatreducedinvest-
mentin replicationof theincumbent'snetworkfacilitiesandatthe
--- -----
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
97. The FederalCommunicationsCommissionnoted:
Congressrecognizedthat,becauseof theincumbentLEC's incentivesandsu-
periorbargainingpower,itsnegotiationswithnewentrantsoverthetermsof
suchagreementswouldbe quitedifferentfrom typicalcommercialnegotia-
tions. As distinctfrom bilateralcommercialnegotiation,the new entrant
comesto thetablewithlittleor nothingtheincumbentLEC needsor wants.
SeeFederalCommunicationsCommission,FirstReportandOrder, FCC No. 96-
325,at ~15 (AugustI, 1996).
98. Section251(c) of theTelecommunicationsAct reads:
(c) ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE
CARRIERS-In additiontothedutiescontainedin subsection(b),eachincum-
bentlocalexchangecarrierhasthefollowingduties:
(1) DUTI TO NEGOTlATE- The dutyto negotiatein goodfaith In ac-
cordancewith section252theparticulartermsandconditionsof agree-
mentsto fulfill the dutiesdescribedin paragraphs(I) through (5) of
subsection(b) andthissubsection.The requestingtelecommunications
carrieralsohasthedutyto negotiatein goodfaiththetermsandcondi-
tionsof suchagreements.
TelecommunicationsAct,47U.S.C.§ 25I(c) (1996).
99. SeegenerallyTrinko,540U.S 398.
404 NYU ANNUAL SURVEYOF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 61:379
sametime increasedcompetition.1°° In requiring incumbent loca!
exchangecarriers to lease local networks at cost plus reasonable
profit, Congressdecided that replication of local networkswaseco-
nomically inefficient and choseregulatoryrules that would tend to
reduce investmentin replication of the incumbent's local network
facilities. Nevertheless,less investmentin replicating incumbent's
facilitiesdoes not necessarilyimply less investmentoverall in local
telecommunications,since the rules apply only to the legacynet-
works,and not to new investments.
Third, the Court is concerned about the fact that the market
for leasing UNEs wascreatedby regulatory fiat and did not exist
voluntarily,sosharingofUNEs was"forcedsharing." In the Court's
thinking thisjustifies Verizon's abusesbecausethe price was "cost-
based" and not "market-based."The decision specifically notes:
"Verizon's reluctanceto interconnect at the cost-basedrate of com-
pensationavailableunder §251(c)(3) tellsus nothing about dreams
of monopoly."lOl The Court notes the difference between Trinko
and AspenSkiing,where the defendant refused to sell at duopoly
prices to a competitor.102But Verizon wasalreadya monopolist i:t;l
both the network servicesand retail servicesmarkets;Verizon did
not need to "dreamof monopoly" since it alreadyhad a monopoly
in both markets.1°3The crucial issue for Verizon as it related to
Trinko,was how the monopolies in both marketswould be main-
tained. I haveoutlined abovehow the practices that raised rivals'
costsand otherwisedisadvantagedrivals helped Verizon maintain
its monopoly.
More generally,I am concerned that here the Court erred in
understandinghow marketsare defined and work. A market is de-
fined by demand for a product or service. Refusal to deal should
not be deemedanti-competitiveonly if it is a refusal to sell at prices
significantlyabove cost, such as monopoly or duopoly prices. As
long as the refusal to deal occursat above-average-costprices (and
leaseprices for UNEs were guaranteedto be abovecost since they
weresetbyregulationat costplus reasonableprofit),the companyen-
gagingin such practicesshould be found liable since it is clear that
100.For example,therulesof the 1996Act requireincumbentsto provide
unbundlednetworkelementsatratesthatwill "attractnewentrantswhenit would
bemoreefficientto leasethanto buildor resell."VerizonCommunications,Ine.
v. FederalCommunicationsComm'n,535U.S. 623(2002).
101.Trinka,540U.S.at409.
102.1d.at 408-10.
103.SeeNicholasEconomides,KagaSeim& V. Brian Viard, QuantifYingthe
BenefitsofEntryintoLocalPhoneService(manuscripton file with the NYU Annual
SurveyofAmericanLaw).'.
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if it sold the productsor servicesthe companywould havecollected
sufficient revenueto cover its costs. Clearly the Court should have
judged Verizon's refusal to sell at above-average-costpricesas anti-
competitive.
In AspenSkiingCo.v.AspenHighlandsSkiingCorp.,AspenSkiing
controlledthreeoutof four skiingslopesin Aspen,Coloradowith
thefourthslopecontrolledbyAspenHighlands.AspenSkiingpre-
viouslyofferedajoint ticketwithits competitor,AspenHighlands,
sothata buyerwouldbeableto skionall four slopeswithrevenue
sharedaccordingto use. In 1978-79AspenSkiingdiscontinued
thejoint ticketand refusedto sell its ticketsto AspenHighlands
evenatfull price,in orderto preventAspenHighlandsfrombun-
dling themwithitsownticketsto recreatethejoint ticketthathad
formerlybeenavailable.The SupremeCourtaffirmedthatAspen
Skiing'sactionswereanti-competitive.104The Courtnoted:
The refusaltoacceptheAdventurePackcouponsin exchange
for dailyticketswasapparentlymotivatedentirelybya decision
to avoidprovidinganybenefitto Highlandseventhoughac-
ceptingthe couponswould haveentailedno costto [Aspen
SkiingCo.] itself,wouldhaveprovidedit withimmediatebene-
fits,andwouldhavesatisfieditspotentialcustomers.Thusthe
evidencesupportsan inferencethat [AspenSkiing Co.] was
not motivatedbyefficiencyconcernsandthatit waswillingto
sacrificeshort-runbenefitsand consumergoodwill in ex-
changefor a perceivedlong-runimpacton itssmallerrival.105
ComparingtheAspenSkiingfactsto thoseof Trinko,one can
expectthata company(i.e.,Verizon)wouldbe morelikelyto re-
fuseto sellat lowerbutstillabovecostpricesthanathigherprices
sincethatcompany'srevenuewouldbeloweratlowerprices.That
is,fromthepointofviewof thecompanycommittingtheanti-com-
petitiveact,theincentivetorefusetosellto competitorswashigher
in Trinkothanin Aspen(assumingthatmarginsin Trinkoarelower)
andtherefore,everythingelsebeingequal,refusaltodealwasmore
likelyto occurin Trinkothanin Aspen.If therefusalto dealof the
duopolistin AspenSkiingwasanti-competitive,therefusalto dealby
themonopolistin Trinkoshouldhavebeenevenmoredamning.
104.Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen HighlandsSkiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
593-608(1985).
105."The 'AdventurePack,'whichconsistedofa 3-daypassatHighlandsand
threevouchers,eachequalto thepriceof a dailylift ticketata Ski Co.mountain.
The voucherswereguaranteedbyfundson depositin anAspenbank,andwere
redeemedbyAspenmerchantsat full value."Id. at594.
_.
HU.
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Fourth,whenthepriceissetbyregulationbelowthemonopoly
price,a monopolisthasan incentiveto discriminateagainstrivals
by:raisingrival'scosts;106reducingthequalityof theinputit sellsto
rivals;or otherwiseimpedingaccessto its product.107In the ab-
senceof regulation,a monopolisthastheopportunityto chargea
high priceand to discriminatein priceagainstits competitorsor
potentialcompetitors.In thepresenceof regulations,suchasthose
imposedbytheTelecommunicationsAct thatreducethepricethe
monopolistcouldchargebelowthemonopolypricebutnot below
averagecostandthatrequireno pricediscrimination,themonopo-
listhasanincentivetoresorttoraisingrivals'costsstrategiesothat
rivalsaredisadvantaged.Suchstrategiesincreasethecostto rivals
andreducethecompetitionandsocialwelfarethatarisefrom the
existenceandcompetitiveoperationof a market.108Additionally,
sometimesraisingrivals'costsmayimposea coston themonopolist
whois implementingtheincreases.Butthemonopolistiswillingto
bearthesecostsbecauseof theimpactthesestrategieshavein rais-
ing pricesand foreclosingcompetition.Although raisingrivals'
costsstrategiesarenot optimalfrom thepoint of viewof themo-
nopolistin thepresenceof unregulatedcompetition,theirusecan
be desirablein thepresenceof a regulatoryenvironmenthatpre-
ventsthemonopolistfromsettingthemonopolypriceandrestricts
pricediscrimination.l09The Courtmissedthispoint completelyby
basingitsthinkingonAspenSkiingasanexception,disregardingthe
factthattherewerenoregulatoryrestrictions,andthereforeno sig-
nificantincentivesto employraisingrivals'costsstrategies.110
Fifth, althoughthereluctanceof the Court to getinvolvedin
thedetailsof regulatorymattersis understandable,thatreluctance
ismisplacedhere.Forexample,theCourtcouldhavedeclaredthat
the degradationof Verizon'sserviceto AT&T wasa monopolistic
practiceandevaluateditsantitrustimplicationswithoutgettinginto
the detailsof the regulatoryprocess.As the SecondCircuit ob-
106.SeegenerallyStevenC. Salop& DavidT. SchefIman,RaisingRivals'Cost,
73AM.ECON.REv.267(1983).
107.SeeNicholasEconomides,TheIncentivefor Non-PriceDiscriminationbyan
InputMonopolist,161NT'Lj.INDUS.ORG.271(1998).
108.SeegenerallyThomasG. Krattenmaker& StevenC. Salop,Anticompetitive
Exclusion:RaisingRivals'CoststoAchievePowerOverPrice,96YALELJ. 209(1986);
Economides,upranote107. ..
109.SeegenerallyKrattenmaker& Salop,supranote108;Economides,supra
note107.
110.VerizonCommunicationsInc. v. LawOfficesof CurtisTrinko, 540U.S.
398,409(2001,1:).
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served,thereisawayfor theantitrustandregulatorysetupstowork
in parallel.1I I
Sixth, there is an important vertical leveragingissuein Trinko
that I discussin the next section.
V.
VERTICAL LEVERAGE IN TRINKO;
RAISING RIVALS' COSTS
A. ForeclosureThrougha VerticalPriceSqueeze
Verizonprovidedandcontinuesto providetwoproducts/ser-
vices:(i) networkinfrastructureservices(hereinafter"NET ser-
vices")toitselfandtoentrantsin localtelecommunications,suchas
AT&T; and (ii) end-usertelephoneservices(hereinafter"retailing
services").At thetimeof theallegation,Verizonhada monopoly
positionin both.1l2The keyactionsof Verizonin theeventslead-
ing to TrinkocanbeseenastheresultofVerizonleveragingitsmo-
nopolyin NET servicesto preserveits monopolyin retailservices.
This issuewasclearlyrecognizedby the SecondCircuit,which
notedthatTrinko "mayhavea monopolyleveragingclaim,"based
on thefactthat"thedefendant'(1) possessedmonopolypowerin
one market;(2) usedthatpowerto gaina competitiveadvantage
. . . in another distinct market; and (3) causedinjury by such an-
ticompetitiveconduct.'"113TheSupremeCourtdismissedtheverti-
calissueusingafallaciouscircularargumentin footnotefour of its
decision,stating,"In anyevent,leveragingpresupposesanticompe-
titiveconduct,whichin thiscasecould onlybe therefusal-to-deal
claimwehaverejected."1l4Thatis,theCourtdismissedthevertical
leveragingclaimbasedon the factthatit had dismissedthehori-
zontalclaim,asif theverticalclaimcouldnotstandon itsown. But
theverticaleveragingclaimdidnotrequireafindingof liabilityon
111."Whileideally,theregulatoryprocessalonewouldbeenoughto bring
competitionto thelocalphoneservicemarkets,it ispossiblethattheantitrustlaws
will be neededto supplementhe regulatoryscheme,especiallywith respectto
injurycausedtoconsumers.»LawOfficesof CurtisV. Trinkov.BellAt!.Corp.,305
F.3d89,112(2dCir. 2002),rev'd,540U.S. 398(2004).
112.SeeEconomides,Seim& Viard,supranote103.SeealsoINDUSTRYANALY-
SIS DIVISION, COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
TRENDSINTELEPHONESERVICE(March2000)(indicatingin Table9.4thatthemar-
ket shareof entrantsusingUNEs in NewYork Statewas0.4%in 1997,0.4%in
1998,and 1.2%in 1999). .
113. Trinka,305F.3dat 108(quotingVirgin Ad. Airwaysv. BritishAirways,
257F.3d256,272(2dCir. 2001».
114.VerizonCommunicationsInc. v. Law Officesof CurtisV. Trinko, 540
U.S. 398,41,1)n.4 (2004).
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ahorizontalrefusal-to-dealc aim.The leveragingof thenetworkto
preservemonopolycanbethoughtof asa specialcaseof theverti-
cal price squeezetheory,discussedearlierin the contextof the
1981AT&T breakup,whichwaswellunderstoodbyeconomists,the
USDO],AT&T, andthejudgeimplementingtheMFJ.
To seethis,considerthedecompositionof theVerizonservices
asshownin Figure3. If VerizonleasesUNEs to rivalsat a price
abovecost,it canforecloseanyrivalfor whichVerizon'sUNEs are
requiredto producelocaltelecommunicationsservices.
Figure3: Competitionin LocalTelecommunicationsServices
NET services + Retailingservices
+ 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
] + [AT&T or othernon-Verizon]Verizon
+
Verizon ] + [ Verizon
Verizon providesNET servicesto its own retailing servicesdivi-
sion at itscostVERIZONCNET.115Combined with retailingservices,such.
as billing and marketing,for which Verizon collectsper unit reve-
nue PRETAlUNG,Verizon sellsthe end-ta-endserviceat price:
VERIZONPLOCAL =VERIZONCNET +VERIZONPRETAlLlNG.
If Veri;lOnleasesUNEs,or sellsNET services,to rivalsin theretail-
ing servicesmarketatan above-costprice, i.e.: '
VERIZONPNET). VERIZONCNET,
thenan equallyefficientcompetitorin retailing,sayAT&T, would
beforcedoutof businessbecauseit wouldhaveto chargea higher
pricethanVerizontofinalcustomersfor localtelecommunications
service.Assumingequalefficiencyin providingretailingservices
betweenAT&T andVerizon,i.e.,
AT&TPRETAlLlNG = VERIZONPRETAlLlNG,
we can seethat the price thatAT&T chargesfor local telecommuni-
cations serviceswill be higher than Verizon's:
115.In discussingcostsin thissection,weassumethatall costscalculations
arebasedon the sameefficientcostTELRlG methodology.As discussedabove,
under TELRIC, ILECs arepermittedto recoverthe networkcosts,certainover-
headcostsanda reasonablerateof return. Thus,VERIZONPNET>VERIZONCNETin all
circumstances,evenif Verizondoesnothing additionalto raiseits rivals'costs
(throughliNEs or otherwise).
oJ
.I.
. U--m
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AT&TPLOCAL =VERIZONPNET +AT&TPRETAILING =
. VERIZONPNET +VERIZONPRETAILING>
VERIZONCNET +vERIZONPRETAILING=VERIZONPLOCAL.
Therefore, if AT&T leasesUNEs (buysNET services)from Verizon
abovecost,AT&T isforced to selllocal telecommunicationsservices
abovethe price at which Verizon sells them:
AT&TPLOCAL > VERIZONPLOCAL.
Thus, AT&T or any other rival in local telecommunicationswhich
has to leaseUNEs from Verizon can be foreclosed.
B. ForeclosureThroughRaisingRivals' Costs
. Alternatively,nowsupposethatVerizonisforcedbyregulators
to leaseUNEs (sellNET services)at cost. Then Verizon cannot di-
rectly seta price for such servicesabovecost,but Verizon can use
raisingrivals'costsstrategiestowardsits competitorsin retailingser-
vices,such as delaysand qualitydecreases,so that it increasesthe
effective cost of NET servicesto them, VERIZONPRRCNET,116to an
amount aboveits costfor such services:
VERIZONPRRCNET>VERIZONCNET.
Then, using the sameargument as in the previous section, faced
with higher effectivecostsfor NET services,equallyefficient retail-
ing competitorswill have to charge a higher price than Verizon's
VERIZONPLOCALandwill thereforebe foreclosedfrom retailingservices.
That is, a rival that is equallyefficientwith Verizon in retailing,
AT&TPRETAILING = VERIZONPRETAILING,
will be forced to sell local telecommunicationsservicesat a higher
price than Verizon:
AT&TPLOCAL =VERIZONPRRCNET +AT&TPRETAILING =
VERIZONPRRCNET +VERIZONPRETAILING >
VERIZONCNET +VERIZONPRETAILING =VERIZONPLOCAL.
Therefore,whenVerizonimplementsraisingrivals'costsstrategies,
AT&T isforcedtoselllocaltelecommunicationsservicesabovethe
priceatwhichVerizonsellsthem:
AT&TPLOCAL > VERIZONPLOCAL'
116. VERIZONPRRCNETis theeffectivecost of NET servicesfaced byVerizon local
servicerivals as a result ofVerizon's raising rivals' costsactions.
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Thus,Verizoncanuseraisingrivals'costsstrategiesto leverageits
monopolyin NET serviceso thatit foreclosesits competitorsin
local telecommunicationsservices,Moreover,Verizon hasan in-
centiveto do so,sincethisstrategyallowsit to maintainitsprofita-
ble monopolyin localtelecommunicationsservices.
VI.
APPLICATION OF THE PROFIT
"SACRIFICEPRINCIPLE"
In decidingTrinko,the SupremeCourt failedto articulatea
cleargeneralrule underwhichspecificconductwill be found to
constitute"willfulmonopolization."The Government'sbriefiil this
caseproposedsuchastandardbasedon the"sacrificeprinciple."117
In my definitionof thesacrificeprinciple,a defendantis liablefor
anticompetitivebehaviorif its conduct"involvesa sacrificeof short-term
profitsorgoodwillthatmakesenseonlyinsofarasit helPsthedefendant
maintainorobtainmonopolypower."118This definitioncoincidesonly
partiallywith thedefinitionof thesameprinciplein the Govern-
ment'sbrief. The Government'sbriefallowsallbehaviorthatdoes
not involvesacrificeof shorttermprofitstobecharacterizedasnot
"exclusionary"andnot "predatory."119I disagree.Conductcanbe
117.BriefofAmici CuriaeUnitedStatesandtheFederalTradeCommission
at 16,VerizonCommunicationsInc. v. LawOfficesof CurtisV. Trinko, 540U.S.
398(2004)(No. 02-682).
118.ABtheGovernmentbriefnotes,thesacrificeprinciplehasbeenusedin
AspenSkiing,472U.S.at608,610-11(conducthat"sacrifice[s]hort-runbene-
fits,"suchas immediateincomeand consumergoodwill,undertakenbecauseit
"reduc[es]competition.. . overthe long run"); GeneralIndus.Corp. v. Hartz
MountainCorp.,810F.2d795,803(8thCir. 1987)(conductanticompetitiveif "its
'anticipatedbenefitsweredependentupon itstendency.to disciplineor eliminate
competitionandtherebyenhancethefirm'slongtermabilityto reapthebenefits
of monopolypower.'");StearnsAirport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170F.3d518,
523-24n.3 (5thCir. 1999)(conductexclusionaryif it harmsthemonopolistbutis
justifiedbecauseit causesrivalsmoreharm);AdvancedHealth-CareServs.v.Rad-
ford Cmty.Hosp.,910F.2d139,148(4thCir. 1990)("makinga shorttermsacri-
fice" that "harm[s] consumersand competition"to further "exclusive,anti-
competitiveobjectives").Brief of Amici CuriaeUnited Statesand the Federal
TradeCommissionat16,VerizonCommunicationsInc.v.LawOfficesof CurtisV.
Trinko, 540U.S. 398(2004)(No. 02-682).
119."Conductis not exclusionaryorpredatoryunlessit wouldmakeno eco-
nomicsensefor thedefendantbutfor itstendencyto eliminateor lessencompeti-
tion." Brief of AmiciCuriaeUnitedStatesandtheFederalTradeCommissionat
15,VerizonCommunicationsInc.v. LawOfficesof CurtisV. Trinko, 540U.S.398
(2004)(No. 02-682).
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exclusionaryevenwithout a sacrifice of short term profits.12OBut
when such a sacrificeis observed,it points directly to this conduct
as being anti-competitive.
Thus, I am not endorsing the sacrificeprinciple asa single cri-
terion to be used in ascertaininganti-competitivebehavior because
there can be caseswhere there is no short-termprofit sacrificebut
conduct does not makesenseexcept to attain or retain monopoly
power. If an action involvesa sacrifice of profits that cannot be
justified exceptto theextent that it helps a companyto create,pro-
tect,or enhancemonopoly power, there is little doubt that suchan
action is anti-competitive.
I note thatverticalleveragingasanalyzedabovepassesthe "sac-
rifice test." In the particularactionsallegedin Trinkoit is clearthat
the behaviorofVerizon to raise the costsof rivalsin local telecom-
munications servicesentailed a sacrifice of profits from potential
leasesof the local telecommunicationsnetwork to entrants in the
retailmarket,and thatthis sacrificewould not haveoccurred ifVer-
izon werenot tryingto protect its monopoly in theretail marketfor
local telecommunicationsservices.Thus; under thesacrificeprinci-
ple, Verizon's actionsare found to be anti-competitive.
In particular, if Verizon did not havea retailing division and
did not try to preserveits monopoly in retailing, it would haveno
incentiveto forecloseor disadvantageindependent retailing firms.
In fact, if its strategywere not to preserveits monopoly position in
retailing, Verizon would have had everyincentive to sell its NET
servicesto all, evenat prices of costplus reasonablepr.ofitasman-
datedby the TelecommunicationsAct. Since Verizon sells its NET
servicesto its retailing division at costwhileany NET servicesprice
sold to third partiesincludesa reasonableprofit, raisingrivals'costs
actions that disadvantagethird party retailing firms and result in
smallersalesof NET servicesto thesefirms clearlyimposeasacrifice
of profits for Verizon. Thus, one could applythe "sacrifice"princi-
ple in the Trinka case,in the sameway that the Supreme Court
articulatedit in AspenSkiing,to conclude that Verizon's raising ri-
vals' costs actions result in a sacrifice of revenue and therefore
would not havebeen taken except to preserveits monopoly.
120.For example,a dominantfirm mayallowabuyertobuyitsproductonly
if it doesnotbuyproductsfromacompetitor.Sucha contractcanbeeasilychar-
acterizedase1fclusionaryeventhoughit maynot involvea sacrificeof profits.
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VII.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
From an economist'spoint of view,Trinkois a poor decision
thatwill enhanceandpreservethemonopolyofVerizonandother
RBOCswhoremainnear-monopolistsin localtelecommunications
markets.The SupremeCourtfocusednarrowlyon thehorizontal
issuesof the caseand missedthe leveragingof monopolypower
from thenetworkinfrastructuremarketto theretailtelecommuni-
cationsmarket.Both of thesemarketswereat the timemonopo-
lizedbyVerizon,but the retailtelecommunicationsmarketfaced
thepossibilityof significantcompetitionif Verizonadheredto the
termsof theTelecommunicationsAct of 1996in leasingnetwork
infrastructureto its rivalsin the retailmarket.This papershows
thatVerizonhadincentivesto leverageitsmonopolyin networkin-
fnistructureso as to preserveits monopolyin the retailmarket.
This could be done throughvariousstrategiesthat raisedrivals'
costsandotherwisedisadvantagedcompetitors.The issueof useof
non-pricestrategiesof raisingrivals'costswasparticularly,impor-
tantbecauseof thepriceregulationimposedbytheTelecommuni-
cationsAct of 1996.The SupremeCourt ignoredtheseissuesand
decidedthiscasein thecontextof AspenSkiingwhereregulation
wasabsent.
Evenin thecontextof AspenSkiing,however,theCourterred
in its applicationof precedent.The SupremeCourthadaffirmed
thatAspenSkiing'sactionof not sellingitsticketsto a competitor
(whowantedtosellthemasabundlewithitsown)'wasanti-compet-
itive. ComparingtheAspenSkiingfactsto thoseof Trinko,onecan,
expectthatVerizonwouldbemorelikelyto refuseto sellat lower
butstillabovecostpricesthanathigherpricessincethatcompany's
revenuewouldbe loweratlowerprices.Thatis,fromthepointof
viewof thecompanycommittingtheanti-competitiveact,theincen-
tivetolrefusetoselltocompetitorsishigherin Trinkothanin Aspen
and therefore,everythingelsebeingequal,refusalto dealis more
likelyto occurin Trinkothanin Aspen.If the.refusalto dealof the
duopolistin AspenSkiingis anti-competitive,the refusalto dealby
themonopolistin Trinkoshouldbeevenmoredamning.Thus,the
Courtfailedtoapplyin Trinkothelogicof theargumentit hadused
to deemtheactionsin AspenSkiinganti-competitive.
In theparticularactionsallegedin Trinko,it is clearthatthe
behaviorofVerizontoraisethecostsof rivalsin localtelecommuni-
cationsservicesentaileda sacrificeof Verizon'sprofitsfrom net-
work leasesthatwerenot signedbecauseVerizon wastryingto
protectits local telecommunicationsmonopoly.Thus, under the\
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sacrificeprinciple,Verizon'sactionswereanti-competitive.Overall,
theSupremeCourt'sTrinkodecisionmissedtheessenceof theanti-
competitivebehaviorinvolved.
